A theory usually comprises assumptions and deduced predictions from them. In this paper, empirical evidences corroborate with assumptions about time for a decision making facing known probabilities and outcomes.
Introduction
In behavioral finance, Kahneman and Tversky presented a descriptive model of decision-making behavior facing probabilistic alternatives involving losses or gains, where probabilities and outcomes are known [1, 2] . The Prospect Theory proposed by them does not contain time as an assumption that justifies the behavior of decision-makers.
In econophysics, Ole Peters and Gell-Mann have assumed that an individual's wealth grows over time according to a stochastic process in a gamble repetition mode [3] . This assumption was later assumed as part of the rational sense, where individuals make decisions so that growth rate of their wealth is maximized over time [4] .
If we consider the growth rate over time as a physical stimulus for decision making, then the contrast ratio between time averages can define a threshold between the stimuli and the sensations (or perceptions) they produce. The reason for this is that we avoid the cognitive effort of calculating rates that evolve probabilities and outcomes. Thus, the fuzziness problem arises, which consists in characterizing the contrast between the growth rates to establish the fuzzy and crisp regions for decision making.
In order to solve this problem, simple gambles and sure outcomes, equivalent on the ensemble average, were modeled similarly to the Kahneman and Tversky's experiments [2] . Through temporal logic, gambles in the gain domain were compared using meiotic argumentation, and gambles in the loss domain were compared by hyperbolic argumentation [5] . Thus, one can observe an S-shaped curve, which "coincidentally" is made up of the usual functions of nonextensive statistical mechanics [6, 7] (being further evidence of how nonergodicity can cause nonextensivity).
In a second version of the Prospect Theory, Kahneman and Tversky highlighted that "the shape of the weighting functions favors risk seeking for small probabilities of gains and risk aversion for small probabilities of loss, provided the outcomes are not extreme" [8] . Therefore, there is another range of gains and losses to be explored. Through the proposed model in this paper, it is shown that better contrasts may be found when the outcomes are extreme.
In order to test the suggested model, an opinion poll was done to see if people facing gambles are searching for the best time average. The problems are similar to those elaborated by Kahneman and Tversky, however, extreme outcomes were used to verify the assumption of repetition, so that the repetition of proposed gambles can lead an individual quickly to great abundance (or ruin), shortening the time until the goal to be achieved (or to be avoided). The obtained results revealed that the temporal impact on the wealth is determining for the decision-making heuristic, showing that the amounts have a wide range of physical stimuli which can present over one heuristic for the same probabilities. Also, it is noted that the contrast ratio between time averages may influence the uncertainty about the behaviors. Thus, there is a need to establish a threshold between physical stimuli for a deepening of psychophysical description.
Theoretical model
Consider that two gain options are presented to an individual, where only one of them can be choose. In order to model these options, we have the hypothesis Θ 2 = "to win M " (M > 0) and a probability p ∈ [0, 1], so that:
l 2 = to win M (at the next moment) with probability p.
The expression "at the next moment" may not appear, but we must consider it, even implicitly, to represent the low waiting time. Moreover, note that both options are equivalents in the ensemble average (expected value is pM for the two options). Now, let us consider an individual called Bob who may repeat similar gambles in the future. If the gamble l 2 is repeated several times until he wins M , then Bob may affirm
where each trial occurs at the next moment with time probability p.
If Bob's repetition has success frequency p and he perform x = M/W 0 on each occurrence, then, by the time average, W 0 (1 + x) p is the wealth temporal expectation at the next moment (after the gamble). Note that p = 1 means that the proposition θ 2 is true, i.e., Bob will win M . In contrast, p = 0 means that the statement F Θ 2 is fanciful because the proposition Θ 2 is false. However, when 0 < p < 1, the proposition Θ 2 is in the status of future contingency, it is neither true nor false.
Meiosis for gains
A rhetoric procedure possible for inquiring the future contingency is the meiosis, where we can elaborate a figure of thought reducing the reward to obtain an affirmative with the maximum sense of certainty. This rhetoric procedure is useful to evaluate risk aversion for gains described by Kahneman and Tversky [2] , where we design a figure of thought assuming which people underestimate risky options and choose gains with certainty (both equivalent on the ensemble average).
If the wealth temporal expectation after the gamble l 2 is W 0 (1 + x) p , then underestimated reward by the time average is W 0 (1 + x) p − W 0 . Thus, the similar future tense which have equivalent outcome to F Θ 2 over time is
where this tense future is elaborated as from modest hypothesis
The statement N θ 2 (p) argues certainty about l 2 according to the probability p. For example, N θ 2 (0) means that Bob thinks "I will win nothing at the next moment" because the probability is null. This strategy in rhetoric is useful because the distinction between N θ 2 (p) and N l 1 depends only on the values of the awards. Thus, taking x ≥ 0, such that x = M/W 0 , Bob can evaluate two options selecting the higher changing, i.e., When we evaluate the expected change at the next moment versus hypothetical change, the line px is tangent to the concave curve (1 + x) p − 1 at the point x = 0, what results in px ≥ (1 + x) p − 1 for all x ≥ 0. We can see an example in Figure 1 , where the dashed blue line x/2 is above the curve •-blue (1 + x) 1 2 − 1. Analogously, a similar illustration can be seen for p = 1/10. We can note that the option l 1 is rationally preferable for any values of M and p, because the line px is always above the curve (1 + x) p − 1. Thus, the concave curve representing the expected positive change at the next moment can be described by
The function ln p (x) ≡ (x p − 1)/p is defined here as in [9] and it is commonly used in nonextensive statistical mechanics [7, 6] .
Hyperbole for losses
If we replace the word "win" for "lose" in the options l 1 and l 2 , then we have the following options that result in the wealth decreasing:
l 4 = to lose M (at the next moment) with probability p. Now consider the hypothesis Θ 4 = "to lose M " for an individual named Bob. If l 4 is repeated until Bob loses M , then this gamble becomes similar to
where the time probability p is implicit for each repetition. The second rhetoric procedure for inquiring the future contingency is the hyperbole, where we may elaborate a figure of thought increasing the loss to obtain an affirmative with the lower sense of certainty. For instance, the option l 3 proposes the certainty of loss at the next moment. In order to compare l 3 and F Θ 4 , the hyperbolic rhetoric may reduce the sense of certainty from l 3 overestimating the loss. For this, let us consider the following hyperbole
The statement L 3 has an exaggeration of loss M p, but uncertain for each attempt over time. Thus, due to repetition, Bob may affirm in the future
to argument a change (1 + px) 1 p − 1 for x = −M/W 0 and −1 ≤ x < 0, where the exaggerated event occurs at the next moment with time probability p. So, by the time average, l 3 and F L 3 are equivalent because the wealth temporal expectations are
When we evaluate the expected change in the future versus hypothetical change, the line x is tangent to the convex curve (1 + px) Figure 2 the dashed black line x represents the expected change of F Θ 4 in the future and the curves * -red and •-blue, belonging to the family of curves e 1 p as in [9] ), represent the hyperbolic argumentation for l 3 , expected change of F L 3 in the future. Therefore, the option l 3 is preferable, but we can note that curves are barely distinguishable from the line for hypothetical changes between -0.2 and 0. The hyperbole as figure of thought is useful to evaluate risk seeking between losses alternatives described by Kahneman and Tversky [2] , where we can assume that people overestimate losses with certainty to choose losses with risk (both equivalent on the ensemble average). However, there is a region of fuzziness for non-extreme losses which may cover up to 20% of an individual's equity.
The fuzziness problem and the S-curve
When we try to understand two simultaneous discourses, speakers with almost the same voice intensity will not be easily understood. Analogously, in logical devices, the contrast between two signals is essential for a interpretation of information. Thus, the fuzziness problem consists in quantifying whether or not two signals have almost the same intensity.
The fuzziness problem arise in financial signals because decision makers may avoid to calculate changes using equity values, rewards (or losses), and probabilities. In order to find gambles into region of fuzziness, we can use a factor to measure the similarity between signals. A factor commonly used is the contrast ratio [10, 11] . Considering the time averages as signals of physical stimulus, then the contrast ratio in dB may be expressed by the following equation
The value xp/pln p (1 + x) is the ratio between the options signals of l 1 and l 2 (See equation 1). Analogously, (e x p − 1)/x is the ratio between the signals of l 3 and l 4 . Figure 3 shows the contrast ratio CR dB for hypothetical changes between -1 and 2. We can note that losses are harder to distinguish than gains. If we consider a region of fuzziness between -0.5dB and 0.5dB, then certain and risk loss, between 0 and -20%, can be fuzzy for judgment. On the other hand, according to time average, options for gains, without very high probabilities, have high contrast ratio for any gain greater 10% (see the •-blue and dashedred curves for x > 0, where p = 0.5 and p = 0.05, respectively).
If we evaluate through the basic principle of the isolation effect [12] , the fuzziness in the field of small losses may lead us to seek another physical incentive to make the judgment. A parameter easily distinguishable in options l 3 and l 4 are the known time probabilities. Therefore, when we are faced the fuzziness, we can simplify theses options by "small decreasing in wealth with certainty" and "small decreasing in wealth with probability p". The small decreases in wealth are almost the same and undesirable, but the uncertainty argues hope for escaping losses and it is desirable. Thus, the uncertain loss will be more attractive in this situation, where fuzziness prevents us from making a better judgment. Then, in order to simulate risk seeking in the small losses region, we must insert a rate ρ into the hyperbolic argumentation process, so that
The rate ρ makes the curve H − p (ρx) more convex. Thus, its first values pass below the line x to simulate the risk seeking. In Figure 4 the red curve has ρ = 1.05 and p = 1/2 to simulate this effect in the interval −0.2 < x < 0. Now we can make a judgment between the sentences F L 3 and F Θ 4 . Both are identical with respect to time, the difference between them is only the decrease in wealth,
= x for small losses, e ρx p − 1 for big losses.
This means that the gamble l 4 is preferable when M represents small losses, but when the losses are large, then l 3 is interpreted as the best option. Thus, the risk seeking may disappear when the signals are distinguishable. In order to understand in practice how the risk seeking disappears when losses are extreme, imagine all the necessary goods for your survival. After imagining them, then what do you prefer? "to lose 50% of all your goods" or "to lose all your goods with probability 0.5"? Note that both options have the same ensemble average, but if you choose the first option, then you understood that a ruin aversion can be dominant for high losses [13] . See the experimental result of problem 1 in the next section, where an analogous situation is presented to respondents.
Finally, the function with expected changes at the next moment, convex for losses and concave for gains, exhibiting a S-shape, can be defined by
In Figure 4 , when p = 1/2 and ρ = 1.05, the function S p (x) has risk seeking for −0.2 < x < 0, but has a kind of ruin aversion for −1 ≤ x < −0.2. The risk aversion is always present for all x ≥ 0 when p = 1/2.
Experimental results and discussion
Questionnaires were prepared to see if people facing gambles seek the one with the best time average. The problems have equivalent options on the ensemble averages (similar to those presented by Kahneman and Tversky [2] ), but extreme outcomes were used to verify the assumption of repetition. Thus, the repetition of proposed gambles can lead an individual quickly to great abundance (or ruin), shortening the time until the goal to be achieved (or to be avoided). All respondents are psychology students from the Universidade Federal do Ceará, Campus Sobral, so it is assumed that they do not have any training about time average. A total of 67 students answered the questionnaire and the percentage of choice in each option is in brackets.
Problem 12 presented in [2] consists of choosing between an uncertain loss with maximum entropy and a certain loss. In this case, Kahneman and Tversky found that most individuals prefer a risky loss rather than a certain loss. However, if we increase the losses magnitudes, then risk seeking can be abandoned. The problem below shows how people present a risk aversion in situations of losses that can lead an individual to ruin. A total of 66 individuals out of 67 preferred to lose half of all their goods, rather than risking losing everything after the coin toss. Some respondents expressed arguments such as "it is easier to continue with half than to start over". This type of argument shows that individuals see gambles as dynamic processes and have the time as a determining factor in their choices. This result is consistent with the high contrast ratio due to maximum magnitude of losses. Figure 3 shows CR dB curve out of the region of fuzziness for p = 0.5 and hypothetical change x = −1. In addition, Figure 4 shows ruin aversion (S-curve above the dashed line representing the risky option) when the loss is maximum.
In the Prospect Theory, one of the quadruple patterns shows that most individuals prefer small chances of receiving a premium than equivalent amounts on the ensemble average. In everyday life, this phenomenon is similar to buying some option contracts on the market (or raffle tickets [14, Chapter. 29] ) for $ 10 in order to stay exposed to a tiny chance to win $ 200. However, according to Kahneman and Tversky, this behavior is not maintained with extreme gains [8] . An analogous problem with very high rewards can be seen below: Only 4 individuals out of 67 expressed interest in taking risks. So, what's the difference between 1) rejecting $ 10 to stay exposed to winning $ 200 with 5% chance, and 2) rejecting $ 10 million to stay exposed to winning $ 200 million with the same chance? When we increase the rewards to the extreme, then their impact on the individual's wealth changes. Arguing about time, $ 10 million is an amount that takes a long time to acquire by most individuals, and an opportunity to acquire it quickly is hard to miss. Therefore, the risk aversion manifested by respondents facing high amounts is consistent with the best time average.
Another behavior of the quadruple pattern is risk seeking even when the probability of loss is high. An analogous problem with very high losses can In Kahnemam and Tversky's experiments without extreme outcomes, risk seeking is preferable even when the probability of loss is very high [8] , but in the above problem, this phenomenon is not observed. First, respondents do not seem to ignore inheritance. Second, they demonstrated risk aversion, because most sought the certain loss that still guarantees a fortune of $ 10 million (a hard amount to achieve over time). So, one of the quadruple pattern, which suggests risk seeking even when the probability of loss is high, can be violated when there are extreme losses.
The contrast ratio between time averages may influence decision-making heuristics. For example, problems 1 and 2 have a high contrast ratio and we note that the fraction of respondents who prefer option b is very high. If these fractions are not far from that expected by the law of large numbers, from Shannon's entropy,
we have an almost certainty about the preference for the best time average because entropy is low (H(0.9851) = 0.1118 for Problem 1 and H(0.9552) = 0.2639 for Problem 2). Therefore, this an evidence that high contrast between time averages may lead to almost certainty about the behavior.
In problem 3, although the loss magnitude is very high, the contrast ratio between time averages is low because of low probability. (see the * -magenta curve in Figure 3 ). In addition, the entropy about behavior in this problem is over three times the entropy of problems 1 and 2 (H(0.7313) = 0.8396). Is this increase in uncertainty a consequence of the low contrast ratio between time averages? Therefore, the contrast ratio between time averages may set a threshold between the physical stimulus and the sensations and perceptions they produce.
The temporal impact on the wealth is relevant for decision-making heuristics. In all the above experiments, the risk seeking observed in the Prospect Theory experiments disappears with increasing outcome magnitude. This result shows that the amounts produce a wide range of physical stimuli which may present over one heuristic for the same probabilities.
Conclusion
This paper provides strong evidence that decision-makers assume indefinite repetitions when probabilistic alternatives involving losses and gains are at stake. Therefore, time may be related to the physical stimuli, where high outcomes and high contrast between time averages may lead decision-makers to choose the best rate for wealth growth over time.
Assuming nonergodic dynamics, the S-shaped curve is rationally composed of functions that can generate nonextensive properties. These functions can help us predict the fuzzy and crisp regions to characterize the perceptions and sensations produced. Therefore, a generalized S-curve may be investigated to describe heuristics for the full range of losses and gains.
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